Letters from Rungholt

aus einem Interview mit Dan Shiftan (Shueftan), das ich schon eine Weile im Bookmark-Folder aufbewahre. So sehr sein Stil (mokant-provokant-arrogant) einem mißfallen kann - und ich hab schon Leute gesehen, denen das Blut in den Kopf stieg, wenn sie seinen Namen hörten…, so oft trifft er doch den Nagel auf den Kopf. Ich persönlich ticke anders als er, ich lasse mich viel mehr von Grundsätzen leiten und würde niemals so rein pragmatisch denken wie er. Trotzdem mag es sein, daß Ideologen-Idealisten wie ich mehr Unheil anrichten als Pragmatiker.

Übrigens erschien das Interview ursprünglich in der JPost, und die Fragen stellt Ruthie Blum, eine Journalistin, die ich immer gern lese, auch wenn ich oft  ganz andere Ansichten habe als sie.  Der Auszug ist lang, weil eine Frage zur anderen führt und ich nicht mittendrin kürzen mag. 

When Olmert reiterated his realignment plan during the Second War in Lebanon, he was chastised by the public for it. His popularity has suffered greatly since then. Are you saying that he was given a bad rap?

No. He deserved a setback, because he mishandled the war.

Secondly, Israelis expected the disengagement from Gaza to lead to a decrease in terrorism, which it didn’t do.

You didn’t expect this?

I certainly didn’t. If I may put it in a broader context: In 1977, when asked if I would leave the Sinai Peninsula for peace, I answered, “What [Egyptian president Anwar] Sadat is offering (a separate settlement removing Egypt from the active violent confrontation with Israel) is so critical for the future of Israel that I would have paid more than merely the Sinai Peninsula, but it has nothing to do with peace. And when we withdraw - indeed, the more we concede to Egyptian demands - the more hostility, hatred and anti-Semitism we will arouse.”

I don’t expect the Arabs to accept us. Even the elite among the Arab citizens of Israel don’t. They would like to undermine our national existence.

Let me stress that I’m not offering concessions because the Arabs deserve them. When they try to destroy us, they deserve nothing. The question is not, “Will we get peace with the Palestinians in return for these concessions?” Because, whatever we do, we will not get peace.

I have one consideration only: How to guarantee Israeli society’s continuing to be as strong as it is. Individual Israelis may be extremely unpleasant, but when you look at the Israeli collective, you cannot but be amazed by the strength and resilience of the society as a whole under extreme pressure. Poets should be praising it. Its strength is manifested in the fact that, on the one hand, it does not turn in the direction of capitulation, like the Europeans; and on the other hand, it does not turn in the direction of radicalization, like the Palestinians.

The beauty of Israeli society is that the more pressure you put on it, the more it gravitates to the center. It is the eighth wonder of the world. Look, people are not leaving this country. People don’t take their money out of this country. Democracy is flourishing - and if it is threatened, it it is threatened from the direction of anarchy, rather than fascism: In other words, what is threatening the separation of powers in government is not the army, but the Supreme Court. Now, I don’t like it, but if you are at war, and your problem is with the Supreme Court, that’s somewhat comforting.

Imagine, 25 years ago, we were on the brink of tearing society apart on the Sephardi-Ashkenazi issue. Today, we’ve got almost a million kids who don’t know whether they’re Sephardi or Ashkenazi. We all but solve problems of a magnitude and multitude that nobody in the world even encounters. This is a most impressive society, and it’s our No. 1 asset. In our arsenal, if there’s one thing hostile Arabs should fear, it is the strength of Israeli society.

A few weeks ago, in an interview with Al-Jazeera, I was asked if Israel lost its deterrence after the Lebanon War. I facetiously responded, “You don’t understand. If I were a hostile Arab, I’d be frightened of Israel, because this country survives in spite of Amir Peretz’s being defense minister.”

This is a society that basically says, “If the government doesn’t function, we’ll function without government.” And it works!

This is a country that, after six years of war - with buses and pizzerias and cafes exploding, and then a million people living in bomb shelters - has a booming economy.

We may be able to do with less aircraft and fewer tanks. We can even survive confrontations with the Arabs that we don’t exactly win. But if, God forbid, we undermine the strength of Israeli society, we’re doomed.

My concern is not whether we will have peace, because we won’t. And my concern is not whether the Palestinians will stop turning to terrorism, because they won’t. My consideration is whether Israeli society will be as strong today and tomorrow as it was yesterday. In this context, we must understand that the perpetuation of the status quo, in the long run, is not an option.

…

 

But, in every situation, you must ask yourself what the smart thing is to do. The key to being politically smart is to forget about justice and conduct a very strict cost-benefit analysis. For instance, would it have been justified to say that once [Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser] Arafat committed this or that act of terrorism, we would immediately destroy PA infrastructure and reoccupy Palestinian cities and refugee camps? Yes, completely justified.

But wasn’t it wiser to do what [former prime minister Ariel] Sharon did - which was not respond to the Dolphinarium bombing [in 2001] until the Americans were on board?

Remember what happened in the interim between the Dolphinarium bombing and Operation Defensive Shield? The Karine A incident. The Americans finally understood that Arafat was a terrorist. As a result, we were able to do something very radical with American support. The difference was enormous, because the Americans shielded us from potentially dangerous European pressures. This was worth waiting for. We have no option of responding to every provocation by indiscriminate mass killing of Palestinian civilians, because of what we are. That is another dimension of the strong society we discussed before.

….

 

Surrounded by a hostile Muslim world - and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s finger nearly on the button - isn’t focusing on the Palestinian issue a form of tunnel vision?

It’s worse than tunnel vision, particularly since the Palestinian problem doesn’t have a solution. Palestinian society has disintegrated. The only reason I would discuss negotiating with them would be to go along with [US Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice’s make-believe, as long as I know that nothing can come of it.

Nor is it only the Iranian issue that is more important. For instance, the problems we’re having with strong mainstream voices in Europe questioning Israel’s right to exist. And, contrary to what they say, this has nothing to do with the Palestinians. Delegitimizing Israel continues, even accelerates, after you withdraw from Gaza. It accelerates after you accept a Palestinian state. It accelerates after you accept the partitioning of Jerusalem. The more concessions we make, the deeper the process in Europe of questioning the legitimacy of a Jewish nation-state grows.

If this is the case, why concede anything whatsoever?

Whatever we do, we should consider primarily how it affects our own society.

…..

 

What is your view of the Bush policy in Iraq?

The Bush policy had two components - destroying the Saddam Hussein regime and bringing democracy to the Arabs.

I was for the first part. I supported the war. But, as I suggested before the war - and you can judge it with today’s hindsight - “Be punitive, not corrective.” Destroy the regime, destroy as much of the infrastructure as it takes. You cannot have somebody like Saddam Hussein succeeding. And this part worked; his regime isn’t there. And the domestication of [Libya's Muammar] Gaddafi cannot be explained without the context of what happened to Saddam.

But bringing democracy to the Arabs? This was foolish to begin with. You cannot sell freedom to people who don’t want it.

Like the Palestinians, you mean?

Nobody is as irresponsible as the Palestinians. But in the Arab world in general, democracy is not something that can be produced exogenously. It must be endogenous and start from one’s own society. If you have enough good guys, then we can come in from outside and break the bad-guy stronghold, so that the good guys can take over. But if there are not enough good guys in a society, then destroying the bad guys and substituting for the good guys doesn’t work.

Are there enough “good guys” in Iran?

Yes. Iran is completely different. In Iran, the problem is the regime, not the people.

At the moment, however, I don’t see any other option but an American military operation in Iran. If there isn’t one, Iran will become nuclear. And if Iran is nuclear, civilized life the world over will be threatened. If Iran has nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia and Egypt will immediately go in this direction; other Arab countries will follow. Radical countries throughout the world will not be able to afford not to develop nuclear weapons. And before you know it, clowns like [Hugo] Chavez in Venezuela will have nuclear weapons - 30-40 countries will have nuclear weapons - and then nuclear war is only a matter of time, and not a very long time, at that.

What about an Israeli attack on Iran?

With all due respect to Israel, we cannot do it properly.

Politically or militarily?

Even militarily. Knocking out the nuclear infrastructure so that it stays knocked out is beyond our capability. Because you need aerial staying power over Iran for weeks.

My hope is that the Iranians would then retaliate massively, which would cause the Americans to respond in a way I would really appreciate.

Such an operation would also be the way out of Iraq. The reason the US cannot leave Iraq today is that it would lose its deterrence. But if it bombards Iran, that problem would no longer exist.

As one who retroactively condones Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I believe that [an American attack] would send a signal to radicals the world over that the US can only be pushed so far.

 

Ich habe auch schon längere Zeit einen Artikel aus dem Jahr 99 gehamstert, retroaktiv ganz interessant zu lesen, in dem sich Shiftan ebenfalls äußert. Es geht um den Plan, einen Sicherheitszaun zu errichten. Nichts liest sich merkwürdiger als Zukunftsmusik rückwärts…

In his comments three weeks ago, Barak was reviving the separation proposal put forward by then-Public Security Minister Moshe Shahal in 1996, following a series of devastating terror attacks in which suicide bombers killed 59 Israelis and wounded some 220 others.

The Shahal proposal called for erecting a fence along Israel’s approximately 190-mile future border with the West Bank, similar to the fence along its border with the Gaza Strip. It also called for some 15 to 18 checkpoints along the border, with similar arrangements to be made around Jerusalem. To avoid unauthorized infiltration, border patrol units, thermal detection devices and reconnaissance planes would be employed. The fence would cost a projected $300 million.

Three years ago, a delegation of senior Israeli police officials visited the border between the United States and Mexico to learn from the American experience. Despite the difficulties that U.S. immigration officials encounter, the Israelis came back with the conclusion Israel could at least equal what the United States is doing along a border that is 10 times longer.

…

 

“The present economic conditions in the Palestinian Authority are worse than during the Israeli occupation, and most Palestinians fear that things will get worse,” Hisham Awartani, head of the economics department at Najah University in Nablus, said last week during a lecture in Jerusalem.

Awartani cautioned against taking the separation idea too far.

“If they want to separate and cooperate, why not?” he said. “But if they mean economic divorce, it is suicide.”

In addition to creating “economic suicide” for Palestinians, separation would create a major security problem for Israel, he warned.

“You cannot have hungry neighbors,” he said.

But some Israeli experts claim that the economic argument is invalid.

Dan Shueftan of Haifa University writes in his soon-to-be-published book, “The Necessity of Separation,” that any improvement in the standard of living in the territories would not necessarily diminish the level of Palestinian violence against Israel.

Shueftan quoted figures showing that Palestinian violence increased even in those years when the Palestinian economy was showing a marked improvement over earlier years. Shueftan further argued that Palestinian radicals are not economically motivated. Because a quick solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is not in sight, he concluded, Israel must adopt a strategy of total separation.

Die Anschläge sind zurückgegangen, und die palästinensische Wirtschaft leidet nicht nur daran, daß sie von israelischen Arbeitsplätzen abgeschnitten ist - was ja angesichts der konkreten Gefährdung durch palästinensischen Terror wirklich eine recht kühne Forderung ist. Sie leidet unter Korruption und Fehlinvestitionen - Schwerter statt Pflugscharen, sozusagen.

Der Formulierung “ökonomischer Selbstmord” stimme ich aber voll zu. Wer ihn begangen hat, waren die Palästinenser selbst, als sie auf Terror statt Verständigung setzten.  Wie es aber möglich ist, daß man ein Volk 1. massakrieren und auslöschen will aber 2. ökonomisch mit ihm kooperieren will, sprich von ihm profitieren will - das muß mir mal einer erklären. Diese Passagen finde ich sehr irritierend beim Lesen. Man möchte sagen, entscheidet euch! Freund oder Feind. Freund kann gern mit mir arbeiten, kein Problem. Feind halt ich mir fern, tut mir leid.

Aber all diese unilateralen Lösungen des Fernhaltens haben Haken, Probleme, die ohne Verhandlungen nicht zu aufzulösen sind. Darum hoffe ich, daß es irgendwann doch noch mal ernsthafe Gespräche gibt, um einen Status Quo zu finden, der für uns alle erträglich ist.